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The UK Media and ‘Europe’: From Permissive Consensus to Destructive Dissent 
Oliver Daddow1 
 
‘This may be the most important proposition revealed by history: “At the time, no one 
knew what was coming”’.2 
 
With Britain’s main parties of government deeply divided on the question of European 
integration, its politicians have been reticent to the point of paranoia about opening up 
national debates about the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Union 
(EU). The national media, by contrast, have had no such qualms about professing their 
opinions on the merits and downsides of the European project and Britain’s contribution to it. 
This article argues that on the issue of ‘Europe’ most organs of the British media have, in a 
variety of ways and for various reasons, been on a journey from 1973 to the present, from 
permissive consensus to destructive dissent. In putting forward this interpretation the article 
adapts Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks’s judgement that, since the signing of the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1991, European policy-making elites have progressively more had to ‘look over 
their shoulders when negotiating European issues’. This is because public interest in 
notionally European-level affairs has risen in proportion to the number and contentiousness 
of landmark decisions being taken at the supranational level. Crucially, there has been a 
marked rise in continent-wide Euroscepticism, with national politicians having to ‘make 
room for a more Eurosceptical public’ when coming to decisions on European integration, 
                                                          
1  Thanks to Simona Guerra, Philip Lynch and Dominic Wring for reading and commenting on previous 
manifestations of this article. I gained useful feedback and sources from the participants at the Chatham House 
study groups; John Peet and Willie Paterson were particularly helpful in talking over the key issues from their 
uniquely insightful perspectives. 
2 Haruki Murakami, 1Q84, book 1, trans. Jay Rubin (London: Harvill Secker, 2011), p.11. 
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especially on sensitive topics such as fiscal union and constitution-building.3 The title of this 
article reflects the specificity of the British case, where a seismic shift took place during the 
1980s. Widespread (but by no means total) media support, sometimes manifest as quiet or 
just plain uninterested acquiescence in the European project conceived in its ‘common 
market’ guise, has given way to a vigorously partisan hostility bordering on a nationalist and 
in some arenas xenophobic approach to the coverage of European affairs.  
The ‘destructive’ element in this process locates the British case at the very hardest of 
‘hard’ variants of Eurosceptical opinion. 4  Chris Gifford has remarked that hard 
Euroscepticism is that strain of populist disillusionment with the European project which 
increased in appeal inside and outside parliament during the Maastricht Treaty ratification 
process 1991-93. It takes various forms depending on medium and is a manifestation of the 
nation’s troublesome search for a cohesive British identity after the loss of Empire in which 
‘Europe’ plays the part of ‘an “other” against which the “new” Britain can be defined’.5 Peter 
Anderson and Anthony Weymouth argue that British identity has increasingly come to be 
constructed out of opposition on political, economic, military and ideological grounds to ‘the 
presence of and perceived threat from an external “Other”, namely continental Europe’.6 This 
narrative expresses suspicion and/or antagonism not so much towards the EU manifestation 
of European integration but to the ideal of integration itself. Hard Eurosceptic discourse in 
                                                          
3  Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of Political Science, 39: 1 (2009), pp.1-23 (at p.5 and 
p.9).  
4 The ‘hard/soft’ model has been developed and refined within work on comparative Euroscepticism; see for 
example Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of 
Euroscepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
5  Chris Gifford, ‘The Rise of Post-imperial Populism: The Case of Right-wing Euroscepticism in Britain’, 
European Journal of Political Research, 45: 5 (2006), pp.851-869 ( p.856). 
6 Peter J. Anderson and Anthony Weymouth, Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union 
(London: Longman, 1999), p.5. 
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Britain, notes Vivien Schmidt, exaggerates ‘the negative aspects of the impact of EU policies 
and practices’.7  
Hard Eurosceptic framing questions the legitimacy of any EU-level law or treaty 
change that might be imposed on the democratic and ‘free’ British by the tyranny of a 
devious centralizing project across the English Channel. It is something of a Realist zero-sum 
understanding of power relations that equates ‘more Europe’ with ‘less Britain’. As this still 
shot from the opening credits to Channel 4’s “Coach Trip” nicely illustrates, the cultural 
context within which this interpretation has come to form, sediment and be transmitted 
around British culture and society is important. Geographical separation has bred a sense of 
psychological distance that the British have rarely felt able or particularly willing to bridge 
effectively, and less and less so since the 1980s.  
 
Image 1: Opening credit of “Coach Trip”. 
 
Copyright 12 Yard Productions 
 
The coach tour of Europe undertaken by participants in this ‘reality’ television show is 
represented less as a relaxing holiday abroad than a dangerous military raid into enemy 
                                                          
7  Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘Adapting to Europe: Is it Harder for Britain?’, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 8: 1 (2006), pp.15-33 (p.30). 
Commented [J1]: Does this need any copyright permission? 
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territory using imagery not dissimilar from that used in the opening credits of the popular UK 
situation comedy “Dad’s Army”.8 Importantly, the coach departs from an England, Scotland 
and Wales wrapped in the British Union Jack flag and enters a ‘continent’ (and Republic of 
Ireland) bathed in the EU flag. The former countries, it implies, are not part of the EU, 
psychologically speaking, and as a result the British are always going ‘to’ Europe rather than 
being a comfortable, integral part of it already. That sense of ‘belonging’ is always in doubt.  
This article explains the cultural diffusion of hard Euroscepticism in Britain with 
reference to what is termed the ‘Murdoch effect’ on the way European affairs have come to 
be reported in many press and to a degree broadcast outlets in the UK’s ‘liberal media 
system’, 9  where the search for competitive advantage has been a perennial ownership 
concern. As Menno Spiering argues, Euroscepticism has become big business as 
ideologically committed and commercially savvy newspaper proprietors and editors have 
sensationalized EU-related matters for public consumption. In particular, they have alighted 
on ‘stories about foreigners trying to lord it over “us”, or about absurd rulings imposed on the 
UK by alien institutions’.10 At best the European polity is notional and weakly formed and 
European affairs are reported by a sceptical media in a country where knowledge of the EU 
political system is the lowest of all member states. Even dramatic advances such as the 
European Constitution are ‘barely known’ to the public,11 so UK tabloid coverage tends to 
exaggerate for effect on the tacit understanding that there will be, at best, a minimal and 
uncoordinated riposte either from EU-friendly politicians or other media. Meanwhile, 
politicians from across the main parties have been complicit in denigrating the EU for party 
gain, with a dwindling number of openly pro-European politicians afraid to challenge a hard 
                                                          
8 Explored in Oliver Daddow, New Labour and the European Union: Blair and Brown’s Logic of History  
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), p.205. 
9 Arjen van Dalen, Erik Albæk and Claes de Vreese, ‘Suspicious Minds: Explaining Political Cynicism among 
Political Journalists in Europe’, European Journal of Communication, 26: 2 (2011), pp.147-162 (p.149). 
10 Menno Spiering, ‘British Euroscepticism’, European Studies, 20 (2004), pp.127-49 (p.139). 
11 Martin Gleissner and Claes H. De Vreese, ‘News About the EU Constitution: Journalistic Challenges and 
Media Portrayal of the European Union Constitution’, Journalism, 6: 2 (2005), pp.221-241 (p.223). 
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Eurosceptical narrative revivified by the Eurozone crisis which has given rise to the 
unedifying notion that Britain is ‘shackled to the corpse of Europe’.12  As we shall see, 
broadsheet newspapers express Euroscepticism in a more restrained fashion, while television 
broadcasters tend to achieve greater balance still. The general trend, however, has been 
towards the predominance of coverage tainted by hard Eurosceptical editorialization. 
The article proceeds in three parts. The opening section sets the scene by assessing the 
nature of the UK media’s change of heart on European integration since EEC accession in 
1973. From general support for membership, manifest at the time of the 1975 membership 
referendum, a combination of dissatisfaction with the EU project and a questioning attitude 
towards UK membership itself have come to characterize the default media setting. The 
second section introduces work on the sociology of media ownership to explain this move 
from permissive consensus to destructive dissent as, in large measure, a function of 
developments in media and political coverage brought about by the expansion of the 
Murdoch empire through the 1980s. The final section considers the symbiosis that developed 
between Thatcherite Euroscepticism and the representations of ‘Europe’ in the popular press, 
suggesting that ‘the Murdoch effect’ is inextricably intertwined with ‘the Thatcher effect’ on 
contemporary Britain. The central argument through the piece is that a study of the former 
rather than latter provides the more persuasive explanation for the size and especially the 
manner of the collapse in media support for the EU in Britain since membership was 
achieved. Contestation arising from an ever-widening and deepening EU has created many 
opportunities for attacking all things European and the media, led by tabloid alarmism, have 
played a crucial enabling role in encouraging the Eurosceptic cause by legitimating political 
criticism of the EU. Not least, however, the media have worked synergistically with 
                                                          
12  For instance Daniel Hannan, ‘Britain is Shackled to the Corpse of Europe’, Mail Online, 6 May 2012, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2140532/Francois-Hollande-French-president-Britain-shackled-
corpse-Europe.html, accessed 25 June 2012.  
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politicians to articulate a workable language of Euroscepticism that has taken hold of the 
popular imagination. 
 
From permissive consensus to destructive dissent 
Observers at the time of the 1975 UK referendum on continued membership of the EEC, as 
well as those looking back with the benefit of hindsight, are inclined to agree that: ‘During 
the campaign, virtually all the mainstream national British press supported the Yes campaign, 
with the Communist Morning Star being the only notable national daily to back the No 
campaign’. 13  Colin Seymour-Ure adds that Labour weeklies such as Tribune and the 
Transport and General Workers’ Union monthly Record, with a regular circulation of 
300,000, provided valuable leadership to the No side in the press.14 More enduring still, 
Ernest Wistrich contends that the Daily Express was also in the No camp, in line with its 
Empire-first conception of Britain’s world role and concomitant criticism of Britain’s 
membership bids in the 1960s,15 although it softened its opposition after the October 1971 
parliamentary vote in favour of accession. 16  Roy Greenslade points out that support for 
membership in UK countries other than England was less than fulsome with Scottish titles 
such as the trade union-run Scottish Daily News backing the No campaign.17 All in all, 
widespread press backing surely helped sway a British public which had been antipathetic to 
the EEC through the 1960s and early 1970s to the Yes side.  
                                                          
13 Mark Baimbridge, ‘The Pre-history of the Referendum’, in Mark Baimbridge, ed., The 1975 Referendum on 
Europe, Volume 1: Reflections of the Participants (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007), pp.49-59 (p.59). 
14 Colin Seymour-Ure, ‘Press’, in David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (London: Macmillan, 
1976), pp214-245 (p.217). 
15 Ernest Wistrich, ‘Lessons of the 1975 Referendum’, in Baimbridge, ed., The 1975 Referendum, pp.109-120 
(p112); Spiering, ‘British Euroscepticism’, p.132. 
16 Paul Gliddon, ‘The British Foreign Office and Domestic Propaganda on the European Community, 1960 -72’, 
Contemporary British History, 23: 2 (2009), pp.155-180 (pp.168-169). 
17 Roy Greenslade, Press Gang: How Newspapers make Profits from Propaganda (London: Macmillan, 2003), 
p.275. 
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Partisan though some newspaper backing undoubtedly was,18 it surely also reflected 
the success of the pro-EEC movement in the government and civil service which actively 
sought to persuade the media, initially to support EEC membership bids and then to buttress 
the case for continued membership once inside the EEC. To begin with, the Yes campaign 
was better backed financially than the No campaign, as well as being better organized and 
more ruthlessly persistent in making its case to individual journalists and broadcasters.19 
Moreover, by 1971 the Edward Heath government had mobilized supportive politicians and, 
as Paul Gliddon documents, top civil servants in the Foreign Office, who worked fervently 
behind the scenes to target key segments of the opinion-forming broadcast media in an 
information-come-propaganda campaign that added up to nothing less than ‘a massive 
publicity drive on membership’.20 Andy Mullen notes that between July and October 1971 
alone, ministers made 280 speeches on the subject, ‘flooded the press with letters’, and set up 
a European Unit within the Information Research Department (IRD) to rebut the claims of the 
anti-European camp.  
In a more cohesive broadcast market than exists today, and when broadcasters were 
seen to be the agenda setters rather than the press, the government was able to concentrate its 
efforts to convince broadcasters on top rated news and current affairs on the BBC and ITV: 
‘Radio and television were particularly targeted, including programmes such as News at Ten, 
Panorama, Today, 24 Hours, Women’s Hour and World at One’. 21  In the interest of 
maintaining a veneer of balance, equal numbers of television and radio slots were set aside 
for broadcasts on behalf of the Britain in Europe (Yes) and the National Referendum 
                                                          
18 Anthony King, Britain Says Yes: The 1975 Referendum on the Common Market  (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp.94-97; George Wilkes and Dominic Wring, 'The 
British Press and European Integration' in David Baker and David Seawright (eds) Britain For and Against 
Europe?: British Politics and the Question of European Integration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp.185-
205 (p.193). 
19 Baimbridge, ‘The Pre-history’, p.59;Wilkes and Wring, ‘The British Press’, pp.194-197.  
20 Paul Gliddon, ‘The British Foreign Office’, p164. 
21  Andy Mullen, ‘From Imperial Third Force to the 1975 Referendum’, in Baimbridge, ed., The 1975 
Referendum, pp.60-76 (pp.73-74).  
8 
 
Campaign (No) organizations in the last fortnight of the campaign.22 By referendum day, 
BBC ‘Impartiality’ polling found just 3% of the audience thought there was ‘a general BBC 
bias in favour of staying in. No one, it seemed, thought that the BBC was in favour of British 
withdrawal’.23 As one prominent Conservative Eurosceptic has reflected, being given airtime 
to make the case against the EEC was difficult enough: ‘What was worse was how [the 
media] distorted whatever we said on the few occasions they gave any space to our views or 
the facts we stated’.24 The 1975 referendum debate is thus good territory on which to consider 
the positive messages about the EEC sent out by broadly the majority of parliamentarians and 
media agents. 
Contemporary media coverage of the merits or otherwise of the EU in Britain exhibits 
a rather different set of tendencies. Now it is the pro-Europeans who feel marginalized or 
ignored: ‘over the past twenty years, pro-Europeanism in this country has declined from 
being the intellectual mainstream of political discourse ... to a distinctly minority position, 
and not infrequently a persecuted one at that.’25 In this interpretation the British are fed ‘Fleet 
Street’s blaring headlines about EU scandals and (specious) incursions such as its outlawing 
of square gin bottles and curved bananas’.26 Cross-party pressure groups such as Britain in 
Europe have felt compelled to spend time and money rebutting the ‘myths’ that have grown 
up around the EU’s regulation and red tape, sovereignty and bureaucracy. 27  Meanwhile, 
websites such as Fullfact.org investigate misinformation about EU rules and regulations in 
the British press as part of its inquiries into the truth or otherwise of statistical claims made 
                                                          
22 Anthony Smith, ‘Broadcasting’, in Butler and Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, pp.190-213 (pp.195-200). 
23 Philip Goodhart, Full-Hearted Consent: The Story of the Referendum Campaign - and the Campaign for a 
Referendum (London: Davis-Poynter, 1976), p.157.  
24  Richard Body, ‘The 1975 Referendum’, in Baimbridge, ed., The 1975 Referendum, pp.153-157(p.154); 
Kieran O’Hara, The Referendum Roundabout (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006), pp.72-83 (p.88). 
25 Hugh Dykes and Brendan Donnelly, On the Edge: Britain and Europe (London: Forumpress, 2012), p.19. 
26 Schmidt, ‘Adapting to Europe’, p.26. 
27 Britain in Europe, Straight Bananas? 175 Anti-European Myths Exploded (London: Britain in Europe). See 
also Dykes and Donnelly, On the Edge, pp. 146-148. 
Commented [J2]: Has Vivien invented this one?  I’ve never 
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by politicians and journalists on a range of national public policy issues.28 The EU also 
engages in image management and myth-exposure through its Press Watch publication,29 
however, the EU institutions themselves have been criticized for lacking professionalism in 
their dealings with journalists, especially those on the ‘Brussels beat’. Even when UK 
Brussels-based journalists do cover EU affairs sympathetically the tone of the original copy 
can easily be altered since ‘there is the capacity to give coverage a direct, Eurosceptic 
inflection where London editors think this is necessary’.30 In this view the EU is constructed, 
largely negatively in the UK, out of the messy process of news management by the 
institutions, the reporter’s reading of the best story, and the editors’ and proprietors’ 
perceptions of the line on EU politics and the British position they believe their readers most 
want to consume. The economic downturn since 2008 has exacerbated the problem from a 
UK perspective. A 2012 report for the Centre for European Reform found that in 2005 there 
were six British daily newspapers with permanent correspondents in Brussels; seven years 
later there were just three, and one of those is based partly in Paris.31 Piecing all this together 
it can be argued that the EU’s ‘communication deficit’ is part self-inflicted, part imposed 
upon it by the domestic focus of national media and increasingly a casualty of cutbacks in the 
age of austerity: ‘lack of active communication, but also a lack of being communicated in the 
media’.32  
                                                          
28 See for instance its March 2012 investigation into the Daily Express front page headline: ‘Now EU Bans 
Plastic Bags’, at http://fullfact.org/blog/Express_plastic_bag_ban_EU-6851. Claims made by EU supporters are 
given equal billing on its website, for example Nick Clegg’s November 2011 assertion that 3 mi llion British 
jobs depend on its EU membership, see 
http://fullfact.org/factchecks/Nick_Clegg_3_million_UK_jobs_rely_directly_on_EU-3087. Both accessed 27 
March 2012. 
29 Neil T. Gavin, ‘British Journalists in the Spotlight’, Journalism, 2: 3 (2001), pp.299-314 (p.307); Anderson 
and Weymouth, Insulting the Public?, pp.154-155. 
30 Gavin, ‘British Journalists’, p.301 and p.304. 
31 David Rennie, The Continent or the Open Sea: Does Britain have a European Future? (London: Centre for 
European Reform, 2012), p.32. I am grateful to John Peet for drawing this report to my attention.  
32 Jochen Peter, Holli A. Semetko and Claes H. De Vreese, ‘EU Politics on Television News’ , European Union 
Politics, 4: 3 (2003), pp.305-327 ( p.320). 
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The sense of besiegement felt by pro-Europeans today is evident and comes from the 
fact that the permissive media consensus in support of the EEC in the 1970s almost entirely 
dissipated over the subsequent decades, to be replaced by a sullen discontent with the EU 
which, especially but not exclusively in its tabloid form, is ‘highly conversationalised, 
emotive and often strongly xenophobic’.33 In her biography of Boris Johnson, Sonia Purnell 
remarks that things altered in the reporting of Europe around the later 1980s and early 1990s 
to such a degree that by 1994 ‘there were only a few brave souls [amongst UK Brussels-
based journalists] left who still felt it safe to present themselves as unquestioning pro-
Europeans, at least in public.’ In fact, Purnell credits Johnson with being the agent of change, 
helping make Euroscepticism ‘an attractive and emotionally resonant cause for the Right.’34 
Significant though Johnson’s stint as the Telegraph’s Brussels correspondent might have 
been, the tone of his reporting echoed longer term developments within the newspaper 
industry that stimulated increasingly hostile coverage of ‘Brussels’ diplomacy. Part 
commercial decision, part ideational, it has all added up to a collapse in press support for the 
EU in Britain. To the ‘vigorously anti-European agenda’ of the Murdoch empire (including 
The Times, Sunday Times, Sun and now the Sun on Sunday35) and the Telegraph Group 
(Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph) we can add the Harmsworth Group (Mail, Mail on 
Sunday and the influential agenda-setter in London, the Evening Standard) as well as the 
Daily Express and Sunday Express.36 Meanwhile, multi-million selling quarterly publications 
such as This England do their bit to present the case against Europe on the back of eulogies to 
                                                          
33 Anderson and Weymouth, Insulting the Public?, p.61. 
34 Sonia Purnell, Just Boris: The Irresistable Rise of a Political Celebrity (London: Aurum Press, 2011), p.115. 
35 The Sun on Sunday replaced the News of the World which Murdoch closed down in July 2011 on the back of 
the phone hacking scandal. 
36  Wistrich, ‘Lessons’, p.112; Brian Burkitt, ‘The 1975 Referendum: Its Impact and Consequences’, in 
Baimbridge, ed., The 1975 Referendum, pp.176-182 (p.180). 
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the British countryside, its history and heritage – ‘For all who love our green and pleasant 
land’ as its website puts it.37 
As newspapers that were formerly supportive of UK membership of the EEC have 
rethought their opinions since accession, and in particular during major periods of 
constitutional debate such as over Maastricht and Lisbon, so newspapers such as the Express 
which, as we have seen, were always critical of the European project, have shifted with them 
to retain a distinctive voice within this highly competitive marketplace. This ‘chase’ to the 
Eurosceptical end of a notional ‘federalist-Eurosceptical’ spectrum of opinion culminated in 
the Express launching a ‘Get Britain out of Europe’ campaign in November 2010, part of its 
‘struggle to repatriate British sovereignty from a political project that has comprehensively 
failed’ and to help the British ‘win back their country’. The newspaper advocates withdrawal 
from both the EU and from the ‘alien, pan-European tribunal’ that is the European Court of 
Human Rights from which ‘It is time to break free’. 38  As Peter Anderson observes, in 
presenting the EU as fundamentally dysfunctional with membership doing Britain more harm 
than good over the long-term, UK withdrawal has been on the covert agenda of newspapers 
such as the Express and Telegraph for some time.39 The Eurozone crisis has injected a greater 
sense of urgency to the reporting and unleashed what have probably all along been the 
Express’s ‘true’ feelings about the EU, as well as letting it be seen to lead the way in 
opposing the EU to attract readers who might find the hopes that Britain can reform the EU 
from the inside fundamentally flawed or rather passé given the depth of malaise in the 
European project.  
                                                          
37 This England website, http://www.thisengland.co.uk/single.htm?ipg=10677, accessed 31 August 2012; see 
also Daddow, New Labour and the European Union, pp.126-127. 
38 Express.co.uk, ‘Get Britain out of Europe’, http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/213573/Get-Britain-out-of-
Europe, accessed 17 March 2012. 
39 Peter Anderson, ‘A Flag of Convenience? Discourse and Motivations of the London-based Eurosceptical 
Press’, in R. Harmsen and M. Spiering, eds, Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European 
Integration (Amsterdam: Rodopi), pp.151-70 (p.164). 
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Providing something of an antidote to the Eurosceptical comment and analysis on the 
press side are the Guardian, Independent and Financial Times, although the Eurozone crisis 
has clearly shaken the latter’s relative faith in the long-term viability of European 
sovereignty-sharing.40 Informed weeklies such as the Economist add a measure of balance to 
the overall picture,41 but in terms of readership numbers and therefore influence over the 
terms of the debate they cannot compete with the top-selling daily newspapers. Away from 
the press, the nature and impact of editorialization in the broadcast media are harder to assess 
with clarity because there is less empirical research to draw upon when reaching a verdict. On 
one hand, Dykes and Donnelly suggest that apart from the Murdoch-owned Sky channels 
‘The BBC and ITV are on the whole neutral on European issues, although both suffer from 
being over-reactive to the daily agenda of the overwhelmingly anti-European press. They 
certainly do not provide a counterpoint.’42 Studies isolating broadcast data from newspaper 
reportage make less happy reading for those supportive of the European project. For example, 
Neil Gavin’s content analysis of television coverage of the build-up and aftermath of the 
launch of the euro in 1998-2000 revealed a largely negative tone to the coverage with the 
British presented as ‘embattled, besieged and threatened’; all in all Gavin judged the 
broadcasts to have been ‘quite damaging to the image of the single currency’.43  On the other 
hand, the BBC is frequently accused of pro-European bias by critics clearly approaching the 
topic from a Eurosceptical perspective. Emblematic of this position is self-styled thorn-in-
the-side of the chattering classes, Vernon Coleman, who cites BBC coverage of European 
affairs as his reason for labelling it ‘A Biased Broadcasting Corporation’.44  
                                                          
40 Dykes and Donnelly, On the Edge, p.142.  
41  Oliver J. Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical Perspectives on Integration 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp.90-92. 
42 Dykes and Donnelly, On the Edge, p.70. 
43 Neil T. Gavin, ‘Media Coverage of the Single Currency in Britain: An Assessment of Television News in the 
First Year of the Euro’, European Community Studies Association Conference, May-June 2001, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/2085/1/002102_1.pdf, accessed 18 April 2012, p.5 and p.8.  
44  Vernon Coleman, ‘The BBC – a Biased Broadcasting Corporation’, (2007), 
http://www.vernoncoleman.com/biasedbr.htm, accessed 20 March 2012. 
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Coleman accompanies his internet broadsides with self-publications including a book 
listing 250 reasons to reject the EU, a paean to ‘freedom and liberty’ dedicated to the memory 
of William Shakespeare, Winston Churchill ‘and the other great Englishmen and 
Englishwomen who must now be spinning in their graves as the country they loved, 
respected, fought for (and in so many cases died for) is torn apart and threatened with 
extinction’.45 The BBC has taken to its editorial blogs to challenge these now long-running 
criticisms of its reporting on Europe by emphasizing how difficult it is, on a controversial 
topic such as Europe, ‘for an impartial news organisation to report without inflaming strong 
views on either side of the debate’.46 There is often more heat than light in the anti-BBC 
tirades and unvarnished critics aside, therefore, it is safer to agree with Gavin’s reading of the 
mainstream UK coverage: ‘few analysts of television coverage have criticized the BBC or 
ITV for editorializing’ and, controversial issues such as the euro aside, the UK is not out of 
step with broadcasters from other nations when treated on a comparative basis.47   
This article privileges press over broadcast coverage for two reasons. First, press 
reporting in the UK reflects continent-wide trends in paying more frequent attention to 
European affairs than does broadcast journalism,48 which tends to concentrate on the visually 
more appealing set-piece summitry and/or Europe-wide crises such as the Eurozone bailout 
negotiations. The second reason is that newspapers have increasingly performed the media 
agenda-setting function on European affairs in the UK, and where we are able most easily to 
track the shift from permissive consensus on Europe to destructive dissent. Put simply, the 
proportion of UK readers consuming Eurosceptic-inclined coverage of EU affairs now vastly 
                                                          
45 Vernon Coleman, England Our England: A Nation in Jeopardy. Sound Reasons to Reject the EU  (Barnstaple: 
Blue Books, 2004), dedication. 
46  Helen Boaden, ‘The challenge of reporting Britain’s role in Europe’, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/theeditors/2011/12/the_challenge_of_reporting.html,  accessed 20 March 2012.  
47 Gavin, ‘British Journalists’, p.305; see also Peter et al, ‘EU Politics’, p.321.[nb I am assuming the quotation 
comes from the Gavin, hence suggestion of ‘see also’ for Peter, just to clarify. Yes, both sources checked; Gavin 
is the quote. 
48 Leen d’Haenens, ‘Euro-vision: The Portrayal of Europe in the Quality Press’, Gazette:  The International 
Journal for Communication Studies, 67: 5, 2005, pp.419-440 (p.422). 
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outweighs those taking in ‘neutral’ or encouraging messages about the daily activities of the 
EU. The next section considers one of the most compelling reasons why: the Murdoch effect. 
 
The Murdoch effect 
 
‘Mr Murdoch said...he wished me to change our European policies. If we couldn’t 
change our European policies, his papers could not and would not support the 
Conservative government’.49 
 
A persuasive argument can be made that Rupert Murdoch’s business interests override his 
interest in ideas or politics. Amelia Arsenault and Manuel Castells, for instance, have 
observed that ‘Murdoch’s political affiliations move swiftly in accordance, not with political 
ideology, but with News Corp’s bottom line’.50 Lance Price suggests that ‘Murdoch is a 
businessman first, second and last. Playing politics for politics’ sake comes very down his list 
of priorities’.51 That Murdoch is known to back different parties in the same country at 
different elections might augment the impression that the mogul has no consistent ideology or 
set of ideals except one: making money for News Corporation. A supporter of Margaret 
Thatcher in the 1980s, the Murdoch press came out in support of Tony Blair in the run up to 
the 1997 election. By 2009 Murdoch had become disillusioned with New Labour – and the 
leadership of Gordon Brown in particular – such that he switched back to supporting David 
Cameron’s Conservatives. The same has occurred in countries such as the US, where the 
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Democrats and Republicans have gained at different times from Murdoch’s financial and 
rhetorical backing in newspapers and on News Corp-owned television stations such as Fox 
News, launched in 1985.  
There is no doubt that Murdoch likes to back a party (or a leader) which (or whom) he 
considers will be most amenable to his business interests. For example, when Murdoch came 
out in favour of Thatcher through the Sun in 1979 he was, ‘Convinced that she held the key to 
the country’s – and [the Tory press’s] – future prosperity, they put their faith in her economic 
policies and trade union legislation. 52  Two years later the government did not refer 
Murdoch’s proposed takeover of The Times and The Sunday Times to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission, a clear signal for Price that the Conservatives effectively ignored the 
1973 Fair Tract and ‘intervened to protect Murdoch’s interests.’53 The 1984 Trade Union Act 
made strike ballots mandatory and outlawed secondary picketing. ‘With this law in place 
Murdoch was assured that he could combat inevitable attempts to thwart his newspaper’s 
distribution [by print unions]. His friendly relationship with prime minister Margaret 
Thatcher had paid off’.54 It set the scene for what would unfold at Wapping when Murdoch 
successfully locked the unions out of the new production plant, at a stroke reconfiguring the 
power relationships at the heart of the British newspaper industry and enabling ‘Murdoch’s 
media empire to become the largest in the UK’.55  
A decade after Wapping, Tony Blair backed a communications bill ‘relaxing television 
and newspaper cross-ownership restriction, popularly called the “Murdoch Clause” because it 
applied only to News Corp.’56 The bill allowed News Corp to purchase a controlling stake in 
ITV, one of the main ways in which the organization has ‘clearly benefited from Labour’s 
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favourable positions on media regulation’.57 It is on the issue of deregulation that we might 
also explain Murdoch’s consistent opposition to the European project, ‘which he opposes on 
the grounds that it imposes undue regulations on British business and provides no 
competitive advantage to the British media industry’.58 Murdoch willingly backed leaders 
such as Blair but he did so, it is alleged, on the implicit understanding that he would 
reconsider his position should they take Britain deeper into the EU integration process, 
particularly by joining the single European currency.  
A former Downing Street insider has ventured that European affairs were part of a 
Faustian Pact between New Labour and the Murdoch machine, sealed when Blair and Brown 
flew to Australia to address News Corp executives shortly before taking office. Beginning 
work in Alastair Campbell’s Downing Street Press Office in 1998, Lance Price was informed, 
‘We’ve promised News International we won’t make any changes to our Europe policy 
without informing them.’59 The beauty of such deals, Price continues, is that they could be 
unwritten but no less clearly communicated or binding for that. Apparently former Australian 
prime minister Paul Keating reassured Blair: ‘You can do deals with [Murdoch] without ever 
saying a deal had been done.’60 Steve Hewlett concurs: ‘If you did a deal with Murdoch, you 
never needed to write it down – if he said it, he always stuck by it.’61 When Blair refused to 
call a referendum on the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty in 2004 he was attacked 
vehemently by Murdoch, who personally insisted on the News of the World labelling the 
prime minister a ‘traitor’ in its headline attacking the decision.62 New Labour was also told 
that it would not receive the backing of News International titles in the 2005 general election 
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unless Blair did a U-turn. ‘He did, and within days The Sun secured the scoop’.63 Backed by 
evidence on Murdoch’s deal-making style and abhorrence of the European project the 
Faustian Pact reading of European policy-making under Blair has taken a real hold in policy 
and academic circles.64 
On this first reading of the Murdoch effect, media regulation is at the forefront and 
politicians are in the box-seat, with Murdoch rather as supplicant, striving to channel the tides 
of political opinion in ways that suit his business interests through murky deals in the 
corridors of power. Yet we can turn that interpretation on its head and depict Murdoch as the 
principal ideas man, with the politicians coming around to his way of thinking on the political 
economy in modern Britain. This alternative and less widely acknowledged reading of the 
Murdoch effect sees politicians benefitting from the ideas and attitudes Murdoch has shaped 
through his media outlets and is well summarized by the Economist’s Bagehot: ‘Perhaps Mr 
Murdoch’s biggest influence has been not so much in persuading people how to vote as in 
moulding a cultural and moral climate for politicians of varying hue to exploit.’ 65  To 
illustrate this interpretation we can turn to the work of David McKnight who prompts us to 
take seriously the role Murdoch’s ideas have played in shaping political debates in Britain 
since the 1980s. A detailed study of The Sunday Times editorials and comment pages over the 
period of Andrew Neil’s editorship (1983-1994), argues McKnight, reveals how politicians 
have come to accept the Murdoch worldview whilst dressing their acceptance up as a choice 
made in response to the demands of globalization and economic liberalization. The medium 
might change from broadsheet to tabloid, but the Murdoch message has been the same: 
deregulated free markets are under threat from the existence of a powerful EU.  
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McKnight argues that Murdoch led the way in establishing a transatlantic ‘bridge’ or 
platform for ideas to be exchanged between Britain and the US during the Ronald Reagan-
Margaret Thatcher years. The flow of traffic across the bridge was largely one way, with The 
Sunday Times under Neil importing into the UK a ‘local variant’ of Reagan’s ‘conservative 
populism’ in the form of ‘market populism’. This approach ‘championed a view of economic 
markets which saw them as the friend of the ordinary people and which damned critics of 
markets as “establishments” and “elites”’. There is insufficient space in this article to drill 
down into the detail of this macroeconomic position, for example on the tenets of Keynesian 
economics, the perils of high social spending and the welfare state, or indeed how Neil 
constructed the ‘establishment’ – including the reviled, anti-competition BBC – opposed by 
the Murdoch press. Two points are, though, of relevance. First, the Neil agenda went some 
way beyond what Thatcher was enacting in Britain. Second, this ‘radical’ outlook came from 
a long-standing engagement with centre-right think tanks in the US; ‘No think tank from the 
left or centre has any kind of relationship to either Murdoch [or] his news media.’66  
How did Neil express Murdoch’s thinking in his coverage of the EEC? Under his 
editorship The Sunday Times articulated an informed Eurocritical position which tested some 
of the linguistic furniture which would then feature in tabloid coverage, as we will see in the 
following section. McKnight gives the example of one of The Sunday Times’s early 
campaigns which were ‘often framed in terms of the ordinary people’ and covered consumer 
protection issues rather than industrial relations or the structural needs of the British 
economy, including topical themes such as airline cartels and limited weekend shopping 
hours.67 From there it was not a large step to take on the iniquities of the EEC’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) which was explicitly framed in terms of an attack on ‘fat payments 
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from Brussels’ to the farmers.68 In 1985 – three years before Thatcher’s Bruges speech – one 
Neil editorial railed that ‘It is bad enough that so much is squandered on uneconomic French 
peasants. But it is absurd that it should be squandered to pay the highest food prices in the 
EEC to part-time Bavarian farmers who drive to their weekend farms in their Mercedes.’69 
Opposing touchstone EEC policies using the ‘straight-talking’ language of the ‘common 
man’ (and it was ‘man’) became the characteristic Murdoch position which has survived to 
the present. When pushed in 1999 on whether the expansion of his television interests 
through News Corp Europe might help him consider closer British ties with Europe, 
Murdoch’s answer was a blunt ‘No’. On the single currency his position was clear from the 
outset: ‘As far as we are concerned, we think the Euro’s a great mistake.’70 
Three things stand out from Andrew Neil’s editorship stint at The Sunday Times. 
First, his coverage framed ‘soft’ Eurosceptic concerns (in this case a quite rational critique of 
the inflexibility and inefficiencies in Europe’s farming policy) using bombastic Eurosceptic 
language reminiscent of Murdoch’s own blunt manner.71 Neil’s critique of the economic 
failings of ‘the traditional European mixed economy’ from the vantage point of his 
newspaper’s ‘radical’ alternative, particularly on the need for low government spending and 
low levels of taxation, was mixed with direct populist-style attacks on individual EEC nations 
in a manner more associated with the tabloid press (see below). Second, Neil’s attention to 
EEC failings pre-dated by some distance the mainstreaming of Eurosceptical opinions that 
occurred through the 1980s. When the contentious issue of the transition from EEC to EU did 
become a hot topic for political discussion in the UK, The Sunday Times and its Murdoch 
tabloid stable mates had been crafting a workable socially conservative populist line to take 
on European matters for several years. Both their loci for attack but more importantly the 
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language they used were picked up on by politicians trying to find a narrative about the 
British in Europe and the wider world that resonated in the post-Falklands War era. Third, the 
Murdoch empire has not been the only repository of hard and/or xenophobic Euroscepticism 
in Britain. Although in newspaper terms Murdoch has been the pace-setter on Europe he has 
been joined by some very willing accomplices in the form of latter-day press barons in the 
mould of Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere who have sought, sometimes but not always in 
vain, to impose their preferred vision for Britain on the political class.72 Richard Desmond at 
the Express and Conrad Black and later the Barclay brothers at the Telegraph and Sunday 
Telegraph have mimicked the Murdoch position to their readers. 
 Murdoch has, however, performed a vital agenda-setting function through both the 
rhetorical devices used to ‘report’ Europe and the level of personal interest he has taken in 
cultivating his empire’s approach to European issues, particularly in his favourite UK outlet, 
the Sun. The following section will delve deeper into the political-media nexus that has 
legitimated and promoted the transmission of hard Euroscepticism in Britain since the 1980s.  
  
From the broadsheets to the tabloids: Euro-criticism becomes Euroscepticism 
 
‘[Blair] also feared a backlash from the Murdoch papers, especially the Sun. A 
referendum was now a step too far.’73  
 
Tabloid coverage of European affairs took on a qualitatively different tone in Britain during 
the 1980s. It became more bombastic, injected a greater sense of urgency into the debates  by 
presenting treaty reforms as major threats to British sovereignty and identity, became less 
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deferential to politicians and ‘elites’, and was deeply critical of ‘foreign’ machinations that 
threatened supposedly objective British interests. We can explain this with reference to the 
Murdoch effect and in particular the manner in which trusted editors such as Kelvin 
Mackenzie at the Sun reframed the national interest around a ‘macho’ martial interpretation 
of Britain’s history and role in the world. The ‘chauvinism’ about Europe and Europeans that 
in 1989 Norman Gelb judged to be ‘unfashionable’ outside the ‘far Right fringe’ had in fact 
come to be the language of hard Euroscepticism in Britain, tipping the balance from a 
legitimate ‘proud sense of insularity’ symbolized by Thatcherite discourse on British 
nationhood into rank stereotyping and strident jingoism.74 Already at the time of the 1984 
budget rebate crisis the Sun had jumped on a campaign by French farmers to reduce imports 
of British lamb with the headline ‘Hop Off You Frogs’, accompanied by badges, a spoof ‘raid 
on Calais and the publication of anti-French jokes. 75  The ‘beef war’ of 1996 would be 
reported in the same fashion.76 A litany of headlines such as the Sun’s ‘Cattle of Britain’ of 
22 May that year sustained a threat narrative that constructed Britain fighting another battle 
against an external enemy (the ’Brussels’ beef ban) which threatened to undermine what a 
Daily Express leader in March 1996 called Britain’s existence as ‘an independent sovereign 
nation with control over our own affairs’.77 
Underpinning what were becoming routine attacks on Britain’s leading partners in the 
EEC/EU there was a discernible drift into the use of military language and metaphor to frame 
newspaper coverage of international affairs, the Falklands War acting as an important catalyst 
in this regard. Roy Greenslade, then at the Sun, recalls that in the build-up to the British 
campaign in the South Atlantic the newspaper set about taking on the role of chief 
                                                          
74 Norman Gelb, ‘Thatcher at Odds with Europe’, The New Leader, 72: 16 (October 30, 1989), p.12. 
75 Greenslade, Press Gang, p.422. 
76 See Wilkes and Wring, ‘The British Press’, pp.200-204. The ‘beef war’ denotes the diplomatic and media 
hostilities that broke out when the EU imposed a ban on British beef exports after the discovery of Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or ‘mad cow disease’ in March 1996. The ban was lifted in June 1996.  
77 Rod Brookes, ‘Newspapers and National Identity: the BSE/CJD Crisis and the British Press’, Media, Culture 
and Society, 21: 1 (1999), pp.247-263 (at p.247 and p.260).  
22 
 
cheerleader for military action against the perceived ‘appeasement’ of the Foreign Office and 
Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. ‘I soon realised that Bouverie Street was now the 
unofficial war office with Kelvin Mackenzie playing chief of staff and Petrie [Tom – News 
Editor] in the role of his aide-de-camp’.78 The Mirror and other Sun competitors were lumped 
in with the Foreign Office and asked why they believed during every international dispute 
‘Britain is wrong and the foreigners right?’ In jumping to Thatcher’s side so vociferously the 
Sun was both giving reign both to its ideological predilections and carving out a distinctive 
position at odds with the generally more cautious approach of other press at the time, 
stooping to ‘levels of bad taste that had never been seen before’.79 Several imperatives were 
at work. Certainly ‘Mackenzie saw the opportunity not just to support the war against Galtieri 
but to open a second front by fighting the war that mattered most to him and to Murdoch, 
sales.’80 This made sense because, as Martin Dunn observes, the Sun in the 1980s was 
battling to become the pre-eminent tabloid newspaper in Britain and was ‘involved in one of 
the great newspaper wars of all time with the Daily Mirror’.81   
The blurred boundaries between patriotism and jingoism in the early 1980s help us 
appreciate how the framing of news stories can impact on the popular imagination, with 
research suggesting that ‘When British press reporters caricature Europe and Europeans they 
marry the language of the stereotype to an underlying racist discourse of cultural difference, 
isolation and economic threat.’82 It is noteworthy in this regard that foreigner-bashing had 
been a part and parcel of media coverage of international affairs in key segments of the UK 
media for several years before Thatcher’s Bruges speech, which is often heralded as a turning 
point in alerting the British public to the perils of ‘ever closer union’ with Europe. Instead of 
being the catalyst her supporters might suggest, it did not take much in and around the 
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coverage of the Bruges speech to alert Thatcherites within and outside government to the idea 
that the European Community could be fitted into the threat narrative.83  
If anything it was the Maastricht ratification process that gave the Murdoch-Thatcher 
consensus on Europe the sustained period it needed to flourish and take a hold of the British 
national psyche. It opened a two-year window during which European affairs became infused 
with the high drama of British politics as Prime Minister Major fought openly with 
Eurosceptic backbenchers to push the Maastricht legislation and the European Communities 
(Finance) Bill through a volatile parliament. Gifford is correct to argue, therefore, that ‘The 
parliamentary debate over Maastricht reflected the continued political currency of the 
arguments made by Thatcher in her Bruges speech’.84 Thatcherites inside and outside the 
press effectively rehashed arguments against Europe and Europeans either as revenge for her 
removal from office by pro-Europeans in November 1990 and/or out of principled opposition 
to monetary integration after the pound sterling was forced unceremoniously from the system 
of fixed exchange rates on Black Wednesday in September 1992.85  
The ‘intensification of anti-European activity in Britain’86 around the time of the 
Maastricht Treaty goes some way to showing the synergies between the Thatcher foreign 
policy agenda and Murdoch-inspired Euroscepticism. Equally noteworthy but less fully 
researched, however, was the high priority accorded within Britain’s European policy 
narratives at this time to xenophobic and especially Germanophobic sentiments which drew 
on recent military encounters to draw attention to ‘the alleged unfinished nature of 
Germany’s historic expansionist ambitions.’87 This was where the straight-talking opinion of 
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the ‘man in the street’ met the populist prime minister seeking to reach out to the middle 
England masses. For instance, it is alleged that at a secret Chequers seminar in 1990 Margaret 
Thatcher claimed that the reunified Germany was trying to achieve through European 
integration what it could not attain through wars because it was in their ‘unreliable character’ 
to act this way.88 Not long afterwards the Secretary of State for Industry made these thoughts 
public, suggesting in The Spectator in July 1990 that the Community was ‘a German racket’. 
He went on to impute to European integration the unfolding of a German plot: ‘I’m not 
against giving up some sovereignty in principle, but not to this lot. You might as well give it 
up to Adolf Hitler.’89 Nicholas Ridley was sacked for this comment, but with politicians 
giving such cues to newspaper owners and editors occasionally in public but most likely off 
the record, it is no surprise that hard Euroscepticism has come to be associated with some of 
the most visceral and unappealing elements of the British national psyche. In April that year 
the Sun, which generally left Germanophobia to The Times, Telegraph, Mail and Express,90 
had fused mockery of Labour leader Neil Kinnock with anti-Germanism and Euroscepticism 
by commenting that while Thatcher was a ‘champion’ for combating the threat of a European 
superstate, Kinnock would be ‘shaking the clenched fist of Euro-power ... warbling 
“Deutschland über Alles”’.91  
Now, the British political elites were not alone in being wary of a reunified Germany 
after the end of the Cold War. President François Mitterrand of France and the Netherlands’ 
Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, both ‘expressed their fears more or less forcefully’ at the 
time.92 However, that Thatcher and the Thatcherites should display such ‘deep distrust of 
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German motives’,93  and in such a manner, opened political but perhaps more importantly 
discursive space within which the history of Anglo-German enmity could be revisited in the 
context of ever more fraught debates over the future shape of the EU. For public 
consumption, of course, anti-German sentiment was subsumed into arguments about how 
best to ‘contain Germany by a balance of power’,94 but the legitimating effects of this anti-
German sentiment in and around the time of the Maastricht ratification process cannot be 
underestimated. It reached an unpleasant nadir in tabloid coverage of the football match 
between England and Germany during the Euro96 tournament, when the Mirror joined the 
Sun and other tabloids in dredging up a series of unsavoury war metaphors on the day of the 
contest, imagery that was repeated across the tabloids and broadsheets in the rematch at the 
same competition in 2000.95 As Greenslade has observed, xenophobia of this kind has rarely 
been far from tabloid coverage of European affairs – political and cultural – over recent 
decades, making not inaccurate John Major’s description of Murdoch’s Sun: ‘the house 
magazine of England-against the world’.96    
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that it may well be appropriate to argue that ‘no one knew what was 
coming’ when Rupert Murdoch begin to build his UK media empire in the 1960s. We now 
have a clearer if not definitive picture, with the Murdoch effect having been seen in several 
dramatic ways throughout the period of Britain’s EEC/EU membership. The rise of the 
Murdoch empire and especially the style of reporting is an essential – perhaps the essential – 
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explanation for the broader media drift from permissive consensus to destructive dissent on 
the question of British-Europe relations. Two conclusions flow from the preceding analysis. 
First, Murdoch’s deep ideological and commercial interest in influencing European 
policy at the national level has transformed a long established and not intrinsically unhealthy 
British suspicion of ‘things Continental’ into an alarmist call to arms against ‘Europe’ 
through tabloid sensationalization and scare stories about the ‘Brussels’ effect on everyday 
life in Britain. British foreign policy-makers have long had a troubled relationship with their 
European counterparts because, at root, they have been unclear about Britain’s identity and 
interests, and how best to protect and promote those interests in a rapidly changing 
international arena through the twentieth century. The loss of the overseas Empire combined 
with growing calls in Scotland and Wales for the dissolution of the ‘empire’ closer to home 
disrupted Britain’s calm sense of self that had survived intact even the upheavals of the 
Second World War.  
The turn to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s was a symptom of Britain’s identity angst 
but it would soon become a casualty of it. Where it has been reported seriously at all, 
‘Europe’ has routinely been depicted in the opinion-forming sections of the British print 
media as a necessary evil in the post-imperial world and as a poor second, at best, to the 
‘special relationship’ with the US. As influential segments of the media became increasingly 
hostile and laced with nationalist bigotry, so politicians came to believe that the scope for 
serious and sustained public discussion of European affairs was dangerous to their personal 
careers and party political fortunes. From accusations of verbal ‘deals’ to direct threats to 
change policy, the Murdoch effect on European policy in the UK might not have been 
decisive in determining politicians’ approaches to European integration, but was surely 
instrumental in engendering a climate of fear on European issues that must have featured in 
pro-European politicians’ calculations about what was and was not possible in this vital realm 
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of British foreign policy. Certainly the evidence from the Blair years is that fear of Murdoch 
inhibited any proactive moves on controversial European topics such as a referendum on 
joining the single currency or, later, the Lisbon Treaty. Further research might usefully 
branch out more than I have been able to here to study the sociological, ideological and 
commercial factors in the broader press drift from permissive consensus to destructive dissent 
through the 1980s and 1990s.  
The second conclusion is that within a fifteen year period of joining, pro-Europeanism 
had gone from being the mainstream position within British politics to a sideshow. Pro-
Europeans were caught off guard and, as their sensitivity to the veiled threats emanating from 
the Murdoch empire grew, they became less and less willing to counter systematically the 
Eurosceptic challenge, either organizationally or in terms of providing a coherent alternative 
narrative to the Eurosceptic rendering of Britain’s global position. Depending on one’s point 
of view, pro-European politicians have either demonstrated a lack of leadership on European 
questions in Britain since accession, or they have played a cunning political game, calculating 
that on a relatively low salience issue such as Europe they can appease Murdoch at no great 
cost (and some likely benefit) to their electoral fortunes at general elections. In sum, the 
Murdoch effect on media coverage of the EU in Britain has been dramatic. It has altered the 
terms of the debate from 1973 to 2012 by convincing politicians from across the political 
spectrum that they should fear the EU and more importantly the backlash of the press should 
they try to publicize a more constructive position on European integration. Tabloid outrage 
against ‘Europe’ has become the stock national style of debating European affairs in Britain 
and this is unlikely to change in the near or even the distant future bar some radical changes 
in media ownership or ideology.               
